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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
RoYAL CANNING CoRPORATION, a
corporation, and CoNTINENTAL
C.-\.srALTY CoMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
IxnrsTRL~

CoMMISSION OF UTAH
and DoRoT:a:Y MARIE HuGHES,
Defendavnts.

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF
This is an action to review the findings and decision
of the Industrial·C'ommiss,ion of the St'ate of Utah from
an award of compensation to Durothy Marie Hughes
against the plaintiffs herein.
The action arose out ·Of an injury sustained by the
said Dorothy Marie Hughes while employed by the Royal
Canning Corporation in Ogden, Utah, on the 8th day of
July, 1940. The applicant "\Vas engaged in sorting cherries for the canning company, which were fed from a
chute on to a belt which was operated from a steel shaft
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run by· ele-ctric motors. The evidence shows that at times
the cherries would stick in the chutes a.nd in order to
~·ontinue the operation, it was necessary for the applicant
to loosen the cherries in the chute so that. the same would
come down ·On to the belt. While reaching· up to the
chute to loosen the cherries; which had become stuck, the
applicant's dress came in contact with the steel shaft?
which operated the helt, and in Home manner adhered
to the same and commenced to wind her dress around the
~shaft. The applicant grabbed her dress in an attempt
to pull the same loose from the shaft and in so doing,
per lrands were c-aught by said shaft, and as a result
thereof she tbecame injured, the injury consisting of
the breaking of .her left arm above the wrist, and 8:· pulling of the right thumb from her hand, injuring the hand
between the thumb and the wrist. The evidence further
shows that at the time of the injury, the machinery was
unguarde.d; that the guards had been rewoved therefrom
for the. purpose ·Of repairs.
·A't the time of her employment which occurred on

July 3, 1940, she was und·er the age of lS years, i.e., of
the age of 16 years; that the Royal Canning Corporation,
her emplorer, :had not ·obtained a permit for her to work
'aS required by the statutes, although it knHw that she
was . under: ·18 years of ·a,ge. . At the time of the injury
the :applieant was working s·e-ven days a week, ten:hours
per day at 30c per hour .
.S·ever~~. _h.earings vvere held before . the Industrial
Coinmission o£ Utah with respect to: this matter after
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'vhich the l~on1mission made its a\vard, a\varding to the
applicant $8.31 per \Yeek for the period of te-mporary,
total disability and $16.00 per \Yeek for a period of 112J;2
weeks for fotal, permanent diability. The .Commission
further awarded double indemnity :on the amount S'O
found due, as prescribed by the statute, hy reason of the
fact that it found thai the applicant was by the plaintiff,
Royal c·anning Corporation, illegally employed.
Apparently then, the only questions to be determined
in this ca.se a·re (1) wa.s the ·award so made by the Industrial ,Commission based upon substantial competent evidence, and (2) ·whether the application of the la.w wi(th
respect to illegal employment in awarding double compensation was proper and within the jurisdiction of the
Commission.
ABGU·M'ENT

\\Tith respeet to proposition number (1) we desire
to ·call the court's attention to the ruling of this court
with respect to findings of the Industrial Commission
wherein it has been de-cided so often and so many times
that any finding made by the c.ommission, which is supported by any .substantial, competent evidence. becomes
conclusive and will not be reviewed by this ·court. A
long list of cases have been decided .which supports the
proposition, a few of which are as follows:

Murr:ay ·City v. Industrial Commission,
55 Utah 44;
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Retewna v. I ndUJStrial Commission,
5:5 Utah 25-8 ;
Amalgamated Sugar Comvany v. Industrial
.Commission, 5'6 Utah 80;
George A. Lowe v. Industrial Commission,
56 Utah 519,
and innumerable other cases.
The question then arises as to whether or not there
was substantial, :competent evidence to support the finding and order of the 'Commission in the award.
The 'Conunission awarded the sum of $8.31 per week
for the period of the temporary total disability ending
August 25, 19·40. With this award the plaintiff brings
no complaint. We are unable to determine, however,
and the finding and order does not reveal the method
employed by the Commission in reaching this amount.
Th~ law provides that this award shall be made on the
basis of 60% of the weekly wage, which was being paid
to the employee at the time of the injury.
·Shortly after the injury and on July 20th, 1'9r40 the
plaintiff, Royal Canning c·orporation filed its report of
the injury with the Industrial Commission indicating
that the applicant was working seven days a week and
wa.s receiving 30¢ per·hour, and the schedule filed by the
plaintiffs, Royal Canning Corporation, Exhibit "4", indicates. that on. July 7th and 8th the applicant worked
ten hours ·each day and the testimony on page 5 of
the transcript of the ·:first hearing No. 12, shows that the
applicant was working ten hours per day. This is als-o
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borne out by the testimony of ~I r. Stringham, the manager of the canning corporation, on pages 7, 8, and 9, of
the transcript marked No. 30.
It appears from this report and

tes~imony

that the

basis of employment ""as ten hours per day, seven days
per week, at 30¢ per hour and such was only modified
by the fact that there were not sufficient cherries to continue the full ten hours, but the evidence .certainly shows
that if there \Vas sufficient fruit on hand, the employment
would be ten hours a day, .seven days a week and this
most ·certainly \Yas and must be construed as the basis
of employment. The amount ·paid for such services
would then be $21.00 per week; 60% of $21.00 would
amount to $12.60. We think that the circumstances in
this case justify such conclusion and in support of the
same \Ye desire to call the court's attention to the law
as recited in 71 Corp. Juris at page 79,6, Section 520, as
follows:
'' "\Vhere there is no weekly rate of wages, but
the payment is by the hour while employed, the
weekly rate may be estimated on the basis of the
number of hours in the regular working vveek.''
In support of this quotation there is cited the case
of Smolenski v. Eastern Coal Dock Compa;ny, 93 Atl.
page 85, which holds as follows:
'I'We think that in an employment and a community where the regulation work-week was six
days a.t ten hours each and the workmen was paid
25¢ an hour, the natural conclusion of law, if they
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tried to -reduce the hourly rate· to a weekly rate,
would be that the weekly rate was $15.00. The
truth is there is no weekly rate, but we are forced
by the statute to fix one in order to determine
the compensation to which the workman or his
depend~nts are entitled. Under this compulsion,
we can think of no better method.''
In the case of R.akie v. Jefferson Coal and Iron Co1r1r
pany, a Pennsylvania case at 105 Atl. 63:8, the·court holds
that in cases of this characjter and in calculations of
weekly earnings, the days in which the mines were closed
and when deceased's idleness during such period was
through no fault of his own, were properly deducted.
In other words, the plaintiffs attempt to make .such ap·plication as would justify a full week's earning of $12.90
in this case cannot be upheld. The method of computation· apparently being that the weekly wage is based upon
the. amount received for the actual time employed during the week. In other words, if a person works only
one day in a week, his wages will be ·computed on a weekly basis a.s of .seven times of his earnings during that
day. ·Or if he worked 3¥2 days out of the week, his weekly
earnings would ·he computed by twi·ce ~the .amount he
earned during the 3,¥2 days which he worked, and this
is in accordanoo with our theory that the applicant was
employed .seven days a week, ten hours a day, at 30¢
per hour; or was on a weekly basis of $'21.00. Also the
case . of Aocord Q.oumiy C~oal Compo;ny o'f Alalb.ama v:.
Bush, 109. Southern 151, advances the doctrine that the
employee shall not lose because of enforced jdleness, arid
·.fb.'en the ·court makes. the following comment:
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'"In suc.h a case as here presented, much
must be left to the sound judgment and judi~cial
discretion of the trial -court, and we cannot here
hold, as a. matter of law, tha.t the conclusion
reached 'Yas wrong· in this respect.''
This rule is als-o borne out in the case of Jensen v. ·
Atla-ntic Refin.ing Compa;ny, a Pennsylvania case, at 105
.Atl. 5-±5.
We therefore submit that we are justified in the conclusion that the applicant was employed ·upon the b.a.sis
of ten hours per day, seven days per week, at 30¢ per
hour.
We repeat, therefore, that we are not apprised of
the method of computation used by the Commission in
arriving at the $8.31 per week.
The ~Commission after awarding temporary total
disability made an award of permanent partial disability,
fixing that award a.t the rate of $16.00 per week. This
the plaintiff complains of.
We agree that if the total amount of earnings at the

.

.

time of injury is the basis -of determining the amount of
compensation payable, then the amount should have been
fixed at 60o/o of $21.00 per week, or $12.60.

However,

as we understand the law with respect to this matter,
as set out in Section 42-1-71, the Revised

~Statutes

of

Utah, 1933, the Commission may take into consideration
the likelihood of an increase in weekly earnings in determining the average

~eekly

wage of the .employee for
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compensation purposes.
which is
follows:
I,

.;

as

We quote from the statutes

"If it is established that the injured employee
was of such age and experience when injured;
that under natural conditions his wages would be
expected to increase, that fact may be considered
in arriving at his average weekly wage.''
The meaning of this .Section of course is that the
Commission may take into consideration the likelihood
of the increase of wages in determining the average
weekly wage of the employee. No doubt the Commission
based its finding upon the evidence found in the tranS·cript marked No. 30 as taken from the hearing at Ogden, Utah, ·On March 18, 1941, and referring to Mr.
Stringham, the manager's testimony. In the perusal
of his testimony· as found on pages 9', 15, 16, 17, 18, and
20 it will at once indicarte t'o 'the ordinary mind that
the applicant was apt in her work and was taking care
of it in good order, and that based upon the experience
had with girls in that kind of employment she could
have earned as high as J$32.00 per week. ,Qf course this
would be on the working with apricots as indicated by
the· testimony which showed that certain ones in the employ were making as high as $32.00 per week. But the
records further .show that the girls were switched from
one to the other in their employment and were not re..:
quired to and did not w·.ork constantly on any particular
kind of fruit. The Commission did not find from this
~vidence D·orothy Hughes wages would increase until
she was earning $3i2.00 per week hut that it would in.. I
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crease until she "~as earning $26.66 per week which would
entitle her to the ~axin1um of co1npensation in the sum
of $16.00 per 'Yeek.
\Y. e submit that this finding is based upon substantial

and competent evidence and under the cases heretofore
referred to, \Yill not be reviewed by this court hut a.re
conclusive upon the parties. It seems to be futile to refer
to law cases ''ith respect to this matter, as the same
must be determined on the question of whether there is
substantial, competent evidence in the record to show
that the earnings ·Of the applicant would in the ordinary
course of business be increased to a point where she
would be earning sufficient to justify an awa.rd of $16.00
per week. It is not a question of law, but a question of
fact.
We submit therefore, that there is substantial, competent evidence to justify the Commission in making its
finding.
However, if it is determined that such finding is not
justified by substantial, competent evidence, we most
earnestly submit that there is c-ompetent evidence to the
effeet that at the time of the injury, the applicant was
earning an average weekly ·wage of $21.00 upon which
the perma.nent award should he based in any event.
The next question we desire to discuss is whether
or not the finding of the c·ommission to the effect that
the applicant suffered a. total, permanent disability, to
the extent of 7!5:<fo of her right hand at the wrist is based
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upon substantial, competent evidence. The p::Lain'tiffs
in their brief, argue extensively and cite a number of
·cases to the effect that the c·ommission erred in such
finding for the reason that, as they argue, there was no
injury suffered by the applicant except the loss of her
right thumb at the proximal joint, and that in as much
as the statute prescribes a specific award for such injury,
the ~Cnmmission was without jurisdiction, to go beyond
such amount in making the award.
The statute, however, provides, ,Section 42.-1-62 of a
1H33 ,Statute, as quoted on page 13 of plaintiffs' brief, as
follows:
'''For any other disfigur·ement or the loss of
bodily function not otherwise provided f.or herein,
such period of compensation as the. commission
shall deem equitable and in proportion to eompensation in other cases, not exceeding two hundred weeks.''
·The statute provides that for the loss of a hand at
the wrist, there shall ibe paid compensation for a period
·Of one hundred fifty weeks.
This above provision, Section ~2-1-62 of the statute,
certainly is not meaningless, and has application to such
conditions as may arise through an injury which is not
covered by the specific statute.
Let us take for illustration a situation wherein a
man's hand is· caught, we '11 say in moving machinery,
and is caught in such a manner that it is destroyed at the
wrist; that at the time of the injury, his arm was twisted
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in the shoulder, and injured or destroyed the nerves
leading to the arm to the extent that the arm became
helpless and \Yas of no use in the performance of work
thereafter. The arm is still there and has not been amputated at or near the shoulder, but is a useless memher.
lTnder the reasoning of the plaintiff, the injured employee 1vould be limited to recovery for loss of the hand
at the \Yrist only- a.nd could make no 'claim for -compensation for the injury to the rest of the arm because the arm
was still there.. Most certainly such would not be the·
case and just such situation is intended to be eovered
by the portion of the statute, above quoted, and we submit is the identical situation which is prevalent in the
case at bar, and that the same is fully supported by substantial, competent evi~dence.
We desire to call the court's a ttenti'on to the evidence
adduced at the hearing on January 29, 19·40, recorded in
transcript 25. Dr. N. Fred~rick Hicken, after an examination of the applicant and on page 4 of the said
transcript, testirfied with respect to the injury, a.s follows:
"There is a large amount of scar tissue,
thickening and induration of the skin of the
tendons underlying th~ old incision from amputation that is apparently interfering with the function of the metacarpal bones. * * * Due to
the scar tissue involving the metacarpal bones,
to whi1ch the first digit is attached it apparently
interferes with the function of those hones, so
that -one cannot say that the disability is limited
to the proximal phalangeal inetaearpal joint, but
ra•ther extends above that joint involving the
wrist. I therefore place the disaihility at between
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70 and 75
of the right hand at the wris~t as
was done on our previous examination. ;This does
not include the cosmetic appearance nor ·does it
take in to consideration that the right hand has
been injured rather than the left. If these conditions We re considered the disability rating
sho~ld be much higher.
Nor is this disability
rating predicated on any interpretation of the
rules or regulations of the ·Commission but is entirely ha~ed upon the limitation of functional
ability.''
1

Then again when upon cross-examination, the doctor
wa.s .asked if the injury was not limited to the loss of the
thumb and to his answer ·"no", the question was put:

'"Q. What else is

there~

A. There is. sear tissue involving the metaraTpal bone which interferes. She has no abduction of the metacarpal bone on the thumb of her
hand, that she would have if she had the joint
because it interferes with the .attachment of the
tendons which go out to the joints of the first
digit of •the hand. The loss is more up here.''
Another question was asked:
'' Q.

That also limits the function of the

wrist~

A. It does not interfere with the pronation
of supination or flexion of the wrist, but it interfeTes with the function of ~the wrist joint, in that
you must have free -abduction and the rotary type
of function of the phalanges on the thumb to get
a good grasp of the hand.
Q.

loss of

You stated that you didn't c.onsider the
right hand, hec,ause ~this injury is to

~the
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the rig·bt band. Do you still 'believe it is between
70 and 75)~ 'l
. A..

·Of the rig-ht hand at the wrist.'' ( Transcript number ~5, pages 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.)
''""ithout quoting further, 'Ye solicit the c.ourt's attention ·to the entire testimony of Dr. Hicken.
Dr. E. J. Capener was then c.alled as a witness and
he also had n1ade an examination of the a.pplic:ant, and
answered this question:
'' Q. You reviewed the case and examined the
applicant and SaW ·the X . . Ta,ys ~

A. Yes, I believe my statement is very
similar to what has already b·een · said.
Y·ou agree w·~th the conclusions of Dr.
Hicken that you have jus·t heard made~
Q.

A.

Yes.

Would your testimony on cross eX!amina.tion be the same as his~
Q.

A.

Practically, I believe.''

It is true that Dr. Kirby and Dr. Lindem did not
testify as to the loss and function of the hand at the
wrist;

~rather

their testimony indicates that there was

no such di!sability. However, as we understand the rule,
it is f.or the Commission to determine whose {estimony
they will accept as to the dis-ability. ·The question so
fa.r as we ean ·det'ermine is not a question of disputed
testimony, but whether or not there is substantial, competent testimony to support the finding of the CommisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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s1on. We most earnestly submit that the testimony of
Dr. Hicken and D.r. ~Capener, if believed by the Commission was sufficient substantial, compe·tent. testimony,
upon which to base the finding that the applicant had
a 76% disability of her hand at the wrist.
If that he true and there is for the ·entire loss of a
hand an award of compensation for 150 weeks, by common computa·tion a 75% loss would en1title the applioont
to an aw·ard of 1121;2 weeks or 75% of the total award
for such loss.
In the case of Vukelich v. Industrial Commission of

Utah, 62 Utah 486, as quoted by counsel for plaintiff on
pa.ge 2·4 ·of his !brief, there was a dispute in that case of
the testimony of the doctors with respe0t to disability.
Two doetors 'teHtified that the disability was 33 lj3<fo,
while one doctor testified the disability was 20<fo.
Commission found the disability to be 33

1/3'%

The

and this

cour:t upheld that finding and we think :properly so. The
·Court then in the above case on p.age 491, in eonstruing the
sta'tute which was heretofore referred to, had this to say:
''In .addi~tion to injurie'S by the loss of particular physical members, the statute places in the
sa.me -class 'any other disfigurement, or the loss
of bodily function not otherwise provided for.'
These words are not meaningless. We think they
evinee · a purpose to include such ·other injuries
a'S are similar to the loss of physical members, in
the respect that they are fixed :and perm.anent,
and .their -consequences and degree of disability
. can be presently ascertained.
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"Accordingly ".l' conc.Iude that t·he evidence
\Yas sufficient to support the findings of the Conlmission that the plaintiff's injury \Vas a. loss ·Of
bodily .function, \vi thin the meaning of the statute,
and that the l--;ommission acted \vithin 'its legal
. po,ver when it computed and n\varded ,the eompensa tion aceording to the rule in such case provided.''
Again in the case of North Beck Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm·ission of Utah, 58 Utah 486, cited by counsel
in his brief on page 21, this :court again discusses the
meaning of :the statute heretofore quoted with reference
to another disfigurement or loss of bodily function, as
follows:
''It seems p1ain .and clear to us that this
amendment was adopte·d for the express purpose
of providing fair and adequate compensation in
cases like the one before us. 'The majority of the
CoJiimission in making the award based i~t on the
idea :that where several fingers ·are lost it is the
loss of a 'bodily function not otherwise provided
for' in the schedule, and that, therefore, the compensation must he awarded in proportion to the
loss of use, to be ascertained by evidence, which
the loss ·hears to the total loss of the hand. c·ommenting upon the position taken by the Commission, counsel for plaintiffs say it is difficult to
s·ee how they .arrive at a 50:fo loss of his han~d
on this basis, because the only evidence in the
record shows that the loss should be 'around 30
or 40 _per cent.' That was the effect of the testimony of a physician at the hearing before \the
C'Ommis'sion. A majority o.f the Commission disregarded the testimony of the physician, evidently
believing that they knew as much as he about the
degree .of efficiency lost by the amputation of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
fingers of a hand. Besides, when the physician's
te.stimony ·was objected to by counsel for Erickson, it was stipulated by the partie·s •t'ha t if the
Commission deemed it a matter for expert testimony the Commission might make such inquiry
from reputable physicians as it deemed advisable.·
At the hearing it was the ·contention of Erickson's
counsel that it was a matter of which the Commission and court's would take judicial notice, and
that ~any intelligent person conversant with t'he
needs of a worki~g man in his particular trade
·could determine .the damage resulting from the
loss of a finger. as well as .a medical man. Some
medical men's judgment would be sound, not particularly because of their medical training, but by
reason ·Of ·their general common sense. The testimony of other medrcal experts would be entirely
worthless, because of eccentricites of the particular physician. At .any rate, the physician ·would
know no more about such matters than any other
i:qtelligent man, and no more than the members of
the Commission. The ,c·ommission determined
that Ericks-on's loss of efficiency of his right hand
was 50 per cent. Erickson is .a miner, ~nd was.
working as .a miner at the time of the accident.
What can he now earn as ~a miner~ Counsel for
plaintiffs argue that with three fingers amputated
one can, with the thumb .and little finger .alone,
do many things; that ·one ean grasp objects such
as shovels and tools and use them efficiently. That
a.ll depends upon what is regarded as efficient
use. We do not .think that a carpenter with three
fingers of his right hand amputated could possibly
be 50 per cent efficient .at his trade, even if he
could grasp tools with the thumb and little finger.
A miner handling pick and shovel or .a,. drill hammer eight hours per day, usuing only the thumb
and little finger of his right hand, would, it a ppears ~to us, pave the grea'test difficulty in doing
50 per cent of the work he could do before the loss
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of the fingers. Doubtless one ean, as suggested
by counsel, button his o'Yn clothes and tie a neektie
''Tith only the thumb and little finger. ln fa'ct
n1any men could easily dispense \ri th the use of
three fing-ers and tie a four-in-hand \Yith neatness
and dispatch, hut tying neckties is not of great
importance in a miner's life and w·ork. The thing
of importance here is "'"hether the miner could
still earn a miner's "\Vages as a miner, or at anything else that a miner can do, and that question
we unhesitatingly answer in .the negative. We
are impressed, from what is common knowledge
of which courts take judicial notice, ~that the a ppellant 's loss ·Of the usability of his hand in his
vocation as a miner exceeds the 50 per cent los:s
of efficiency found 'by the Commission, and that
if the Commission made any mistake it was nnt
in finding· the percentlage of loss -of ·Claimant's
right hand to be in excess ·Of 50 per ~cent. As to
the percentage of loss of efficiency, we .are, however, not concerned. That is a question of fact
wholly within the provinc.e of the Commission for
decision. If it adopted the proper method of
estimating compensation, as we :think .it did, the
question of the amount of the loss of efficiency
is wholly one of fact that is not reVIiewable here.''
We submit therefore that there is subs\tanti al, competent evidence in the record suffi'Cien1t to base the finding of the Commiission that there was a. 7·5% loss of the
applicant's hand at the wrist. Again we suggest that
this is a question of fact to be determined by the Commission from 1the evidence and ·not a. question of law,
and tha~t there being substantial, competent evidence
upon which the Commission could base such finding, that
the s.ame i•s conclusive and will not be ·reviewed by this
court.
1
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We next desire to discuss the proposition of whether
the application of :the law with respect to illegal employment in awarding double compens'ation was proper and
witliin the jurisdi·ction of the ·C·ommission.
There is no dispute that the applieant was under the
age required by law when she was employed by the plaintiff, Royal Canning Corp.orat1ion, and there likewise is
no dispute that ·she did nolt have a permit to work as
required by the statute.
The only question that plaintiffs' raise with respect
to this matter is that some pers~on whom they say had
some ·connection with the Industrial C·ommission reque·sted the employment, and that the plaintiff was attempting
to cooperate with that person and by reason of such cooperation, .the pl·aintiff failed to obtain the permit required hy law. There was s-ome claim by the plaintiffs
that the duty was upun the applicant to obtain the permit.
Now with respect to the connection of the person with
the InduHtrial Commission through which the plaintiff
attempted to charge the Commissi:on with sending the
applicant to work; we call. ·the court's atten.tion to the
transcript number 12 on pages 26 and 27, the following
questions were propounded to Mr. Stringham, by Mr~
Jones:
'

'

"·Q~ Which w~ould be sent to you by the In~
dustria.I,C:ommission and you :would employ them~

A. Yes.
Mr. Shields: Wait a minute.
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Conunissioner J udp;ler: Not the Industrial
Commission, you don't mean that.
~-\.
The employ1nent office under the direction of the Industri,al Commission.
~Ir. Shield·s: I object to rtha.t because that
. is a conclusion.
By ~Ir. Jones:
Q. \\"'"ho had direction of that~ Was there
some lady '\Yho used to c.ome over from Salt L·ake
to work with you in this pla.c.ement bureau~
A. I imagine that was worked with the
placement bureau.
Q. What 'vas her name~
A. Lottie Shupe.
Com. J ud g;ler: Mrs. Shupe is director of the
\\-romen's Division of the Industrial Commisision
and has nothing to ·do with the employment
division.
Mr. J·ones: · You know what her position is~
Com. J udgler : She has no connection with
the unemployment division.''
·Counsel in his brief then cited s'ome criminal cases
which go to the question .of inducement wherein the court
holds that, where defendant is lured hy an officer into
.commission of an act, there should not he a eonvicti'on.
We fail to ~see any connection 'between these cases, and
the case at bar.
We -call the ·cour~t's attention to the fact that an
award! is made to the applicant here under the provisions
,.
of the ~statute and just how her rights can be jeopardized
or set aside by any .act .of the Co:rnmissio·n, aS"suming
that the Commission was in .any way· responsible for·the
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failure of the employer to obtain the permit is just a
little difficult to understand.
We .feel th at this matter being statutory, the statute'S
should be strictly construed and applied. L~et. us see what
the legislature says with respect to this matter. We call
the cou:vt's attention to Section 14-·6-3 of Chapter 11 in
the Laws of Utah, 1933, which reads as follows:
1

'"No minor under eighteen years of age shall
be employed, permitted, or suffered to work in
any place of employment, dangerous or prejudicial to the life, he~a1th, safety or welfare of such
minor. * * * N.o minor under eighteen years
of a.ge shall be employed, permitted or suffered
to work in oiling, :cleaning, or wiping machinery
in motion, in applying belts to a pulley in motion
or assisting therein, or in proximity to any un. guarded bel·t or gearing.''
We desire to call the court ,.s attention again· to the
r·eport made by the plaintiff, Royal Canning Corporation
in reporting this accident. Under question number 21
·On the report, we find the following, ''Was the machinery
or part guarded~'' '·'Yes". ''Was gua.rd prope-rly atta,ched at the time of injury~'' No answer. '·'If not,
who removed it~'' ''A. R.emoved for repair.''
Mr. Stringham testified, transrc.ript 12 at page 4.6·, as
follows:
'' Q. Mr. Stringham at the place where she
was injured is where the guard was missing~
. ,,
A. Yes, s1r.

Again the testimony of Ruth Douglas,
number 12., page 40:

tr~an,s-cript
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• ·t~. On the other side \\ here 8he wen~t the
guard "~as out "~here the machinery had been
broken·?
7

A.

Yes.''

It then is not a question of "~hether ·or not the plaintiffs actually placed her to 'York on ·the side of the belt,
"~here the machinery 'Ya.s unguarded, but if she was permitted ·to work by the en1ployer in proximity to an unguarded belt or gearing, the employer comes within the
provisions ·Of the statute, ·above quoted.
Now "~ith respect to the permit and upon whom rests
the duty "i.th respect to obtaining the permit, we desire to
call the court's attention to Secti'on 14-6-5 of Chap. 11 of
the· Session Laws of Utah, 193.3, which is as follows: ·
''No minor under eighteen ye.ars of age shall
be employed, permitted, or suffered to work in,
about, or in connection with any occupation, unless his employer has procured before the employment of said minor an employment cer~tificate
issued as herein~after prescrihed, except that such
minors may be employed without such a certificate outside of school hours, in h·ousework, agricultural work and in casual work usual to the
home of the employer; provided, that such employment shall not be in connection with nor form
a part of the business, trade, profession or occupation of the employer.''
,Section 14..J6-6 -designates who shall issue such permits and Seetion 14-6-8 prescribes the method of oibt'aining 'such permit.
We are unable to determine how the language could
be more s·pecin:c in prescDibing a duty upon an employer
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to refuse to employ or permit the employment of a minur
in a business, such as the plaintiffs in this case operates,
without that permit which the statute positively says
must be procured. by 'such employer.
We see in the ,Section ·no exceptions and ll'O place to
inject excuses. I 1t simply -calls upon the employer to procure the permit and until he does so, not to permit such
employee to work. The law is very specific.
We submit, therefore, that the applicant in this case
was illegally employed for two reasons, (1), that she was
permitted ·Or suffered to work around unguarded machinery and ( 2), she was also permitted and suffered to
work in the business of the plaintiff without the plaintiff
having procured the permit required by the law, and the
plwintiff was n'ot mistaken by the situation. ·He was advised when the .applicant filled out her application, which
is in the record as applicant "s ' '·Exh:Ubi~t A' '. Under the
question "age'', is found, 1'6. At that ·time the plaintiff
·
was put on notice as to the age of the applicant.
With respect to the procedure in eases of illegal ·employment, we ·call the court's attenti'On to ·Seetion 14-6-27,
of Chapter 11 of the Session Laws of Utah, 1933, which
reads as foll.ows :
''In ~the event of accidental injury to a. minor
who is found upon inve-s~tigatlion to be illegally
employed by an employer subject to the provisions
of the compen'sation law, s.aid minor shall not be
debarred from receiving -compensation, but shall
.be ep.titled to double ~the compensation to which
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he would be e-ntitled if legally employed; provided. that the insurance earrier shall be li,able
for all reas{)nable medical .and hospital expenses
. ,_ incurred in healing the injury, plus one-half o'f
the compens-a.tion to be paid, an·d the employer
shall be li•able for the additional one-half of said
compensation a·s a penalty for the illegal employment -of said minor."
This Section of the statute is not meaningless, and
as we view it, it was the intent ·of the legislature in sueh
cases, a.s the case at bar, tha!t not .only sh'ould the ,Q!ommission apply the statute, but the injured employee, as
a matter of right, is entitled to have th~ statute applie-d
on her behalf.
We do not believe the ·Commission er·red in ap·plying
tills Section of the statute, in granting double compensation in this case.
-For the reasons herein stated, we respectfully submit-that the findings .and order of the .Commission in this
case should be sustained and judgment by this court
should be s-o entered.
Respe-ctfully submitted,

A. H. HouGAARD,
E. LEROY 'SHIELDS,
LEGRANDE L. BELNAP,
GROVER A. GILES, Attorney General
for the 1State of Utah, .
. Attorn.eys for. Defendd!nts.
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